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Abstract Apart from some general issues related to the
Gender Identity Disorder (GID) diagnosis, such as whether
it should stay in the DSM-V or not, a number of problems
specifically relate to the current criteria of the GID diagnosis
for adolescents and adults. These problems concern the con-
fusion caused by similarities and differences of the terms
transsexualism and GID, the inability of the current criteria to
capture the whole spectrum of gender variance phenomena,
the potential risk of unnecessary physically invasive exam-
inations to rule out intersex conditions (disorders of sex de-
velopment), the necessity of the D criterion (distress and
impairment), and the fact that the diagnosis still applies to
those who already had hormonal and surgical treatment. If the
diagnosis should not be deleted from the DSM, most of the
criticism could be addressed in the DSM-V if the diagnosis
would be renamed, the criteria would be adjusted in word-
ing, and made more stringent. However, this would imply that
the diagnosis would still be dichotomous and similar to ear-
lier DSM versions. Another option is to follow a more di-
mensional approach, allowing for different degrees of gender
dysphoria depending on the number of indicators. Consid-
ering the strong resistance against sexuality related specifiers,
and the relative difficulty assessing sexual orientation in
individuals pursuing hormonal and surgical interventions to
change physical sex characteristics, it should be investigated
whether other potentially relevant specifiers (e.g., onset age)
are more appropriate.
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Introduction
Transsexualism first appeared as a diagnosis in the third edi-
tion of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (DSM-III) (American Psychiatric Association, 1980).
Besides transsexualism, a separate diagnosis of Gender Iden-
tity Disorder of Childhood was also introduced. Instead of
classifying transsexualism as an Axis I diagnosis within the
chapter Psychosexual Disorders, DSM-III-R (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 1987) classified it as an Axis II disorder,
i.e., one of the disorders ‘‘typically beginning in infancy, child-
hood or adolescence.’’ Also included was a diagnosis Gender
IdentityDisorder of AdolescenceorAdulthood, Nontranssexual
Type (GIDAANT) for cross-gender identified individuals who
did not pursue sex reassignment. A diagnosis Gender Identity
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (GIDNOS) was used for
those who did not fulfill criteria for the specific gender identity
disorders. In the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2000), only one specific diagnosis, Gender Identity Dis-
order (GID), was included. Here, GID was viewed as basically
one Axis I disorder that could develop along different routes and
could have various levels of intensity (Bradley et al., 1991).
The DSM has consistently approached gender problems
from the position that a divergence between the assigned sex
or ‘‘the’’ physical sex (assuming that ‘‘physical sex’’ is a one-
dimensional construct) and ‘‘the’’ psychological sex (gender)
per se signals a psychiatric disorder. Although the termi-
nology and place of the gender identity disorders in the DSM
have varied in the different versions, the distress about one’s
assigned sex has remained, since DSM-III, the core feature of
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the diagnosis. The DSM has also always made a distinction
between GID in childhood, adolescence and adulthood, and
the category GIDNOS.
In this article, we will review problems and criticisms with
the current DSM criteria for GID in post-pubertal individuals.
The debate on whether GID should remain in the DSM (e.g.,
Winters, 2005) is a different one and will be discussed else-
where by Meyer-Bahlburg (2009). Here, we assume that a
diagnosis related to atypical gender identity will not be re-
moved from the DSM. We will not focus on the meta-structure
of the DSM diagnoses either, as this will also be addressed by
Meyer-Bahlburg (2009). In our review, we will discuss criteria
for both adolescents and adults. The current criteria are the same
for the two age groups, and there are very few studies on ado-
lescents with GID only. Whenever appropriate, we will address
adolescent issues separately.
This review is based on the research literature, informa-
tion coming from transgender communities (Vance et al., in
press), and clinical experience of the authors until June 2009.
It does not reflect the discussions and subsequent decisions of
the DSM-V subworkgroup on GID, leading to the final rec-
ommendations of the workgroup to the APA.
Reliability and Validity of the Current Criteria
Important in the decision to maintain a distinct diagnosis is
the question whether or not the diagnosis can be made reli-
ably, that is, whether different clinicians assessing the same
persons will come to the same diagnoses. As noted earlier,
this is especially important for the diagnosis of GID, because
one of the most drastic medical treatments, sex reassignment
surgery, may ensue from this diagnosis. Unfortunately, in the
clinical research literature on adolescents and adults, such
inter-rater reliability studies have not been done. Also, no
structured interviews assessing DSM-IV-TR GID and GID-
NOS diagnoses have been developed, and no comparisons
have been made between clinical diagnoses and diagnoses
based on structured interviews. This means that there is also a
lack of formal validity studies in this area. However, with
regard to the diagnosis of transsexualism according to the
ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1992), there is some
evidence for diagnostic reliability. According to the German
Law for Transsexuals (1980, Bundesgesetzblatt I, 1654), in
force since January 1, 1981, all applicants for a legal change
of their Christian name (independent of sex reassignment
surgery) and/or for a legal change of the personal status as
male or female (after sex reassignment surgery) have to be
assessed by two independent experts, before the court will
rule on such changes. The experts have to confirm the diag-
nosis of transsexualism according to the diagnostic criteria
of the ICD-10, F64.0, which bear a close resemblance to the
DSM-IV-TR criteria. In the first decade of the application of
the German Law for Transsexuals, more than a 1,000 cases
have been processed by the courts (Weitze & Osburg, 1998).
Very rarely, the court had to ask for a third, independent
expert opinion or to make its decision without consulting a
third expert, because the two independent experts did not
agree in their evaluation (Pfa¨fflin, 2009; Weitze & Osburg,
1998).
Validity of the DSM diagnosis can, perhaps, also be in-
ferred from studies that have been conducted to evaluate sex
reassignment as a treatment procedure (see Pfa¨fflin & Junge,
1992, 1998 for studies until 1990; Gijs & Brewaeys, 2007 for
studies between 1990 and 2007). Since the publication of the
DSM-IV in 1994, five of these follow-up studies explicitly
mention the use of DSM diagnoses (Bodlund & Kullgren,
1996, Lawrence, 2003; Lobato et al., 2006; Rakic, Starcevic,
Maric, & Kelin, 1996; Smith, van Goozen, Kuiper, & Cohen-
Kettenis, 2005). In these studies, the mean follow-up period
ranged from 12 to 60 months; 976 participants were ap-
proached and 428 participated in the follow-up studies, a
response rate of about 50%. In about 3%, unsatisfactory re-
sults were reported. It should be noted that an ‘‘unsatisfactory
result’’ does not necessarily imply post-operative regret
about the sex reassignment or a wish to live in the original
gender role again (Kuiper & Cohen-Kettenis, 1998). Some
participants in follow-up studies were just very dissatisfied
with the surgical complications, unhappy about losses in their
lives (family, friends), or experienced little acceptance in
their social environments. However, even if all unsatisfac-
tory results are included, sex reassignments based on DSM
diagnoses primarily resulted in satisfying results, in terms of
alleviating the discomfort about one’s sex or the ‘‘gender
dysphoria.’’ Although diagnosis and response to sex reas-
signment are not very closely connected, and the reported
findings are certainly no ‘‘proof’’ of the correctness of the
diagnosis, they suggest that the elements of the DSM diag-
nosis are clinically useful. This not only applies to the DSM-
IV-TR criteria, but also to the earlier DSM diagnoses, be-
cause studies prior to 1990 have shown similar results
(Pfa¨fflin & Junge, 1992, 1998). The conclusion has to be
drawn with reservation, though, because it is conceivable that
non-participants in follow-up studies were misdiagnosed.
Core aspects of GID (gender dysphoria and gender iden-
tity) have also been measured in a dimensional way. Since the
publication of the DSM-IV, these included the Gender Dys-
phoria Interview and the Gender Dysphoria/Identification
Questionnaire reported on by Zucker et al. (1996), the Gender
Identity/Gender Dysphoria Questionnaire for Adolescents
and Adults (GIDYQ-AA) by Deogracias et al. (2007) and
Singh et al. (2009), and the Utrecht Gender Dysphoria Scale
(UGDS) by Cohen-Kettenis and van Goozen (1997). The first
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instrument was used in a study on women with congenital
adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), but no data were reported on
persons attending gender identity clinics. The reliabilities of
the GIDYQ-AA and UGDS are high: a Cronbach’s alpha for
the GIDYQ-AA of .97, and for the UGDS of .66–.80 in one
sample, and .78–.92 in another. The lower alphas on the
UGDS were only found among control subjects, which may
be related to the lower variability of gender dysphoria in these
groups. Both instruments showed good discriminant validity,
when adolescents and adults with and without a GID diag-
nosis were compared. Sensitivity and specificity rates of
90.4% and 99.7% were reported on the GIDYQ-AA, using a
cut-point of 3 on a 1–5 point scale. These studies indicate that
gender dysphoria can be reliably and validly measured. How-
ever, these instruments are only now beginning to be used in
clinical practice.
Problems with the Current Diagnostic Criteria
Apart from more general concerns regarding the GID diag-
nosis for adults, a number of problems specifically relate to
the current criteria (Appendix 1). These problems concern (1)
the similarities and differences between the terms transsex-
ualism and GID, (2) the inability of the current criteria to
capture the spectrum of gender variance phenomena, (3) the
potential risk of unnecessary physically invasive examina-
tions to ‘‘rule out’’ intersex conditions if the C criterion re-
mains part of the diagnosis, (4) the necessity of the D criterion
for a GID diagnosis, and (5) the fact that the diagnosis still
applies to postoperative transsexuals.
Similarities and Differences Between the Terms
Transsexualism and GID
The appearance of the diagnosis ‘‘transsexualism’’ in the DSM-
III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) occurred approx-
imately 50 years after estrogens and androgens became avail-
able and after considerable progress had been made in the field
of genital surgery and anesthesiology. It had, therefore, become
possible for individuals to pass socially and (partially) ana-
tomically as a member of the other gender in an unprecedented
way (Bullough, 2007). Reports on Christine Jorgensen, an
American who underwent hormonal and partial surgical sex
reassignment from male to female in Denmark (Hamburger,
Stru¨rup,&Dahl-Iversen,1953),werecelebrateduponher return
to the U.S. for having had a ‘‘sex change.’’ Initially, neither she
nor her doctors had intended the ‘‘sex change’’ but wanted to
‘‘cure’’ Jorgensen’s ‘‘homosexuality.’’ At the time, homosexu-
als were considered to suffer from an abnormal sex drive, and
castration was seen as a way of helping them to reduce their
libido and allowing them to feel more at ease (Hertoft &
So¨rensen, 1979). Only afterwards, when the case became pub-
lic, did the team accept the results as a ‘‘sex change.’’ The treat-
ment created not only sensational stories in the public press, but
also criticism from psychiatric circles (Meyerowitz, 2002; Os-
trow, 1953; Wiedeman, 1953). The treating physician, Ham-
burger, was accused of complying with the patient’s demands
rather than offering psychotherapy to treat the ‘‘sexual perver-
sion.’’ This was the beginning of a still ongoing, territorial
struggle between clinical disciplines for the domination of the
field.Because, in theearlyyears, therewerenoofficial standards
of care issued by a professional organization, (surgical) treat-
ment quality differed widely. At the time, neither eligibility re-
quirements for sex reassignment nor diagnostic procedures
were based on multidisciplinary consensus. Diagnosis and eli-
gibility decisions were not standardized: ‘‘Centers in the Wes-
tern hemisphere offered surgical sex reassignment to persons
having a multiplicity of behavioral diagnoses applied under
a multiplicity of criteria’’ (Walker et al., 1985, p. 80). Due to
concern about this unfavorable situation, The Harry Benja-
min International Gender Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA, in
2009 re-named the World Professional Association for Trans-
gender Health [WPATH]), the first international profession-
al organization in the field, distributed the Standards of Care
(SOC) for the treatment of gender dysphoric persons in 1979
(first published by Walker et al., 1985). The aim of these stan-
dards was to set minimal standards for the assessment and de-
termination of eligibility for hormonal and surgical interven-
tions, thereby providing optimal care (Coleman, 2009). The
same concern forquality health care and the conviction that psy-
chiatrists or mental health professionals with sufficient knowl-
edge of psychopathology should make the decision about the
sex reassignment applicant’s eligibility contributed to the inclu-
sion of the diagnosis in the DSM-III.
After the introduction of the first published version of
HBIGDA’s SOC (Walker et al., 1985), referral for hormonal
and/or surgical interventions was made dependent on the DSM
diagnosis of ‘‘transsexualism’’ by those who used the SOC,
because it was feared that individuals not meeting the criteria
would not benefit from the medical interventions and be at risk
for postoperative regret.
The previous DSM and ICD diagnoses of ‘‘transsexualism’’
closely linked the diagnosis of transsexualism tohormonal and
surgical sex reassignment. The diagnosis was often used as
little else than a search for the ‘‘true transsexual,’’ in order to
refer the person for hormone and surgical treatment. This use
gave rise to the criticism that diagnosis and treatment options
were too closely connected. However, the current GID diag-
nosis is often still used as if it were identical with the diagnosis
of transsexualism. For example, in a paper by Sohn and Bos-
inski (2007, p. 1193): ‘‘Transsexualism is defined as a strong
and persistent cross-gender identification with the patient’s
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persistent discomfort with his or her sex and a sense of inap-
propriateness in the gender role of that sex…(DSM-IV-TR)’’
(ouremphasis). Clinicians who have tomakesex reassignment
surgery decisions indeed have the need for a diagnosis spe-
cifically addressing the seriousness of the condition (Bower,
2001). Although it may be that the current GID diagnosis for
adolescents and adults intended to indicate a condition as se-
rious as transsexualism, the criteria are, in fact, somewhat
broader. For instance, the A criterion can be met if only one of
the symptoms—‘‘stated desire to be the other sex,’’ ‘‘frequent
passing as the other sex,’’ ‘‘desire to live or be treated as the
other sex,’’ or ‘‘the conviction that he or she has the typical
feelings and reactions of the other sex’’—is fulfilled. With
regard to the B criterion, only a persistent discomfort with
one’s sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role
associated with that sex is required. This implies that a man can
meet the two core criteria if he only believes he has the typical
feelings of a woman and does not feel at ease with the male
gender role. The same holds for a woman who only frequently
passes as a man (e.g., in terms of first name, clothing, and/or
haircut) and does not feel comfortable living as a conventional
woman. Someone having a GID diagnosis based on these
subcriteria clearly differs from a person who identifies com-
pletely with the other sex, can only relax when permanently
living in the other gender role, has a strong aversion against the
sex characteristics of his/her body, and wants to adjust his/her
body as much as technically possible in the direction of the
desired sex.
In adolescents and adults, the persistent discomfort with
one’s sex or sense of inappropriateness in the gender role
of that sex is, according to the DSM-IV-TR, manifested by
symptoms such as a preoccupation with getting rid of one’s
primary and secondary sex characteristics (e.g., request for
hormones, the surgery, or other procedures to physically alter
sexual characteristics to simulate the other sex) or the belief
that he or she was born the wrong sex. The current formula-
tion thus indicates that the wish to completely alter one’s
body (e.g., a complete sex reassignment) is optional for hav-
ing a diagnosis. Again, this implies that individuals having
varying degrees (and perhaps types) of cross-gender iden-
tification and discomfort with their sex characteristics, which
constitutes a broad range of gender variant people, may all
fulfill the DSM criteria for GID. Yet, in publications on GID,
virtually no attention is paid to the severity of the condition. It
might be argued that other DSM diagnoses (e.g., mood dis-
orders) also cover variations in severity. In the case of some
mood disorders, however, this aspect is explicitly addressed.
We believe that, in the case of a treatment as drastic as sex
reassignment, which is a unique treatment in psychiatry, the
diagnosis on which treatment decisions are based should be
either as specific and unequivocal as possible or, alterna-
tively, it should be made much more explicit than hitherto in
the DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR that the gender identity related
diagnosis covers a broad area of conditions comprising much
more than transsexualism (see below).
The Inability of the Current Criteria to Capture
the Spectrum of Gender Variance Phenomena
A second problem with the current criteria is that gender
identity, gender role, and gender problems are conceptual-
ized dichotomously rather than dimensionally. For instance,
the accompanying DSM-IV text states that adults with GID
are preoccupied with their wish to live as a member of the
other sex, manifested as an intense desire to adopt the role of
the other sex or to acquire the physical appearance of the
other sex through hormonal or surgical manipulation. Within
the GID criteria, a concept such as ‘‘cross-gender identifi-
cation’’ also assumes that there are only two gender identity
categories, male and female. As Bockting (2008) points out,
‘‘Transsexuals were candidates for a change in sex…and the
emphasis of the Real Life Test was on ‘passing’ in ‘the
opposite’ gender role’’ (p. 214). However, gender problems
come in many forms and they may reflect gender identities
other than male or female.
Bockting (2008) asked 1,229 U.S. transgendered persons
to describe their transgender identity. Besides the more
classical binary view on transgenderism, reflected in respon-
ses such as ‘‘female-to-male’’ and ‘‘male-to-female,’’ ‘‘for-
merly transsexual,’’ ‘‘woman with a correctible birth defect,’’
and ‘‘displaced male,’’ a number of responses reflecting more
of a continuum or categories different from male/female were
also given. Examples of this more gender diverse view are
‘‘in-betweenand beyond,’’ ‘‘shemale,’’ ‘‘bigender/two-spirit,’’
‘‘third gender,’’ ‘‘genderless,’’ gender neutral,’’ ‘‘pan-/poly-/or
omnigendered,’’ ‘‘gender fluid,’’ ‘‘intergendered,’’ ‘‘M2T
dyke tomboy,’’ ‘‘butch queen,’’ ‘‘75% female but no plans on
surgery or hormones,’’ and ‘‘androgynies.’’ In contrast to the
traditionalbinaryview,gendervariancemaybeconceptualized,
as gender variant people apparently already do, as a multidi-
mensional or sometimes idiosyncratically conceptualized, mul-
ticategorical construct (e.g., Cole, Denny, Eyler, & Samons,
2000).
The gender issues of some, but not all, gender variant
people will signify distress as a result of a ‘‘discrepancy be-
tween anatomic sex and gender identity’’ (Bornstein, 1994;
Ekins & King, 2006; Lev, 2007; Røn, 2002), but it is unlikely
that all gender variant people fulfill current GID criteria. In
those who do experience distress, this may vanish once they
have accepted one of the previously mentioned definitions as
an adequate definition of themselves and are able to live
accordingly. In others, some distress may remain, resulting in
a life-long search for new adaptations. In again others, the
behaviors may be an expression of persisting gender variant
identities, but not necessarily complete cross-gender identi-
ties (e.g., Diamond & Butterworth, 2008; Lee, 2001).
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The person’s awareness of one’s (more or less complete)
atypical identity has also resulted in different treatment goals.
For instance,a group of individuals reporting tohavea ‘‘third,’’
‘‘other’’ or ‘‘nor male nor female’’ gender identity seek contact
with medical professionals to have surgical or chemical cas-
tration only (Johnson, Brett, Roberts, & Wassersug, 2007;
Wassersug, Zelenietz, & Squire, 2004). Indeed, clinicians
in gender identity clinics are increasingly confronted with
treatment goals other than complete sex reassignment. Hage
and Karim (2000) reported that, even in the years that their
gender identity clinic in Amsterdam did not offer partial
treatment, only 138 of 352 female-to-male applicants for sex
reassignment surgery, who were referred for treatment over
20 years, underwent phalloplasty. Of the 1,049 male-to-fe-
male applicants, 24% had hormone therapy but no genital
surgery. A considerable number of ‘‘sex reassignment surgery
applicants’’ wereapparentlynotpursuinggenital surgery atall.
Because sex reassignment surgery is covered by insurance in
the Netherlands, it is unlikely that the choice of no surgery or
partial surgery was due to financial reasons. Although this lack
of interest in genital surgery may partly be explained by cau-
tion because of the less than optimal surgical results, gender
identity related motives may also play a role.
When the policy of this clinic changed and individuals
requesting partial treatment were not a priori rejected for
assessment and treatment, ‘‘atypical’’ treatment wishes were
more often explicitly formulated at application. Some natal
females, for instance, wish to have a metaidoioplasty, but
keep their neoscrotum open, as they still want to use their
vaginal opening for sexual contact. Natal males may want to
have estrogens and breast enlargement surgery, but no vag-
inoplasty. Such treatment goals may reflect a gender identity
other than a complete cross-gender identity. In the years 2007
and 2008, about 10% of the Amsterdam applicants for medi-
cal treatment desired partial medical treatment (certain hor-
mones and/or certain types of surgery only). Although the
first versions of the SOC of the WPATH only focused on
‘‘complete’’ (that is, feminizing/masculinizing hormone treat-
ment and surgery) sex reassignment for transsexuals, the cur-
rent version (Meyer et al., 2001) acknowledges the spectrum
of gender variant developments and accompanying wishes
for medical interventions other than ‘‘complete sex reassign-
ment.’’ Rather than determining if a person is a ‘‘true’’ trans-
sexual and thus eligible for a complete sex reassignment,
hormone therapy and surgery are seen as separate treatment
options in their own right. Yet, many professionals still do not
medically treat persons who do not completely fulfill GID
criteria.
The heterogeneity of gender variant individuals suggests
that dimensionality in the diagnosis would be a much better
reflection of the gender variance spectrum than the current
categorical one.
The Potential Risk of Unnecessary Physically Invasive
Examinations to ‘‘Rule Out’’ Intersex Conditions If the C
Criterion Remains Part of the Diagnosis
The C criterion of the diagnosis, ‘‘The disturbance is not
concurrent with a physical intersex condition,’’ was included
because gender dysphoria in individuals with and without
intersex conditions (now called disorders of sex development
or DSD; Hughes, Houk, Ahmed, Lee, & LWPES/ESPE
Consensus Group, 2006) differ in a number of ways. Meyer-
Bahlburg (1994, in press) demonstrated differences between
the groups in prevalence, age of onset or presentation, sex
ratio, and associated or predictive factors. Because gender
dysphoria does occur in individuals with DSD and gender
identity was not considered to be entirely dependent on
biological factors, gender dysphoric individuals with DSD
were classified as having a GIDNOS diagnosis.
Some advocate deleting this criterion (e.g., eminism.org).
They state that clinicians now sometimes perform physically
invasive (and probably expensive) examinations with the
only purpose to ‘‘rule out’’ DSD. Clinically, this makes no
sense. In adolescents or adults, a simple examination will
show whether there are symptoms of primary or secondary
sex characteristics possibly indicative of DSD. In their ab-
sence, ‘‘invasive’’ diagnostic procedures do not have to be
performed. Only in their presence, which is rare, ‘‘invasive
procedures’’ may be necessary, because they may have sig-
nificant implications for the person’s understanding of their
gender issues as well as important implications for genital
surgery and sometimes for hormone treatment or cancer risk
assessment.
The Necessity of the D Criterion for a GID Diagnosis
In the DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR, the point A (cross-gender
identification) and B criteria (discomfort with one’s assigned
sex) are necessary in order to be able to make the diagnosis.
The question is whether the D criterion (impairment or dis-
tress) is equally necessary. Applicants for sex reassignment
indeed often experience their gender dysphoria as unbearable
and as having a tremendous negative impact on their lives.
Even if they have satisfying social and family contacts and
are successful at work, the burden of their gender dysphoria
may impede or even damage their functioning. A relationship
between psychological or social impairment and GID is also
suggested by reports on a relatively high prevalence of psy-
chiatric problems among individuals with GID (e.g., Bodl-
und, Kullgren, Sundblom, & Ho¨jerback, 1993; De Cuypere,
Janes, & Rubens, 1995; Hepp, Kraemer, Schnyder, Miller, &
Delsignore, 2005). This may have various causes. Social
stigma is one possible factor (e.g., Nuttbrock et al., 2009),
difficulty of getting appropriate treatment, or rejection by
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family and friends (Factor & Rothblum, 2007; Ryan, Hueb-
ner, Diaz, & Sanchez, 2009) are other ones, as well as the
experienced incongruence between one’s gender identity
and physical characteristics, which may be disconcerting in
itself.
High percentages of psychiatric comorbidity, however,
are not always found. In many studies, transsexuals were
found to generally function well psychologically in the non-
clinical range (e.g., Cole, O’Boyle, Emory, & Meyer, 1997;
Go´mez-Gil, Trilla, Salamero, Goda´s, & Valde´s, 2009; Har-
aldsen & Dahl, 2000; Mate-Kole, Freschi, & Robin, 1990;
Miach, Berah, Butcher, & Rouse, 2000; Seikowski, Gollek,
Harth, & Reinhardt, 2008; Smith, van Goozen, & Cohen-
Kettenis, 2001; Smith et al., 2005). Indeed, clinically, one
may see applicants who are employed, have relationships,
and function socially without any problems, yet very strongly
desire sex reassignment. They state that they do suffer from
the incongruence between their anatomic sex and gender
identity, but that it does not interfere with their lives to the
point that they are not able to function satisfactorily. This
implies that impairment is not necessarily associated with
gender dysphoria, although older applicants may have expe-
rienced periods in their lives in which they did not function
well.
Absence of impairment is most clearly illustrated by some
of the adolescents who want sex reassignment. In the Neth-
erlands, adolescents are eligible for pubertal delay with
GnRH analogues if they are fulfilling criteria for GID from
early childhood on, have reacted with an increase of the
gender dysphoria to the first pubertal changes, have no psy-
chological problems that may interfere with the diagnostic
work-up or with treatment, can be adequately supported
during treatment, and demonstrate knowledge and under-
standing of the treatment and its consequences (Cohen-
Kettenis, Delemarre-van de Waal, & Gooren, 2008). The
ones who had supportive parents, who knew already in child-
hood that they could have puberty delaying treatment soon
after the first physical signs of puberty and prior to cross-
sex hormone treatment, and who had accepting peers and
teachers usually do not remember any impairment, distress or
suffering in childhood or early adolescence. At the time of
referral, all want to live in the other gender role (something
they often already do before their referral to gender identity
clinics) and strongly desire hormone and surgical treatment,
but, probably because of this lack of impairment or even
current distress, adolescent applicants for sex reassignment
as a group function psychologically better than adult appli-
cants (de Vries, Kreukels, Steensma, Doreleijers, & Cohen-
Kettenis, 2009). Their functioning is in sharp contrast to that
of adolescents living in less accepting environments, and who
may be at high risk for self-harm and suicidal behavior (Di
Ceglie, Freedman, McPherson, & Richardson, 2002; Gross-
man & D’Augelli, 2007).
Unfortunately, if one does not consider their condition as
inherently distressful, a DSM-IV-TR GID diagnosis cannot
presently be given to applicants for sex reassignment. This
implies that well functioning applicants who report to be free
of distress would, for this reason, not be eligible for sex
reassignment. Currently, clinicians solve the dilemma by
focusing on the ‘‘dysphoria’’ aspect of the diagnosis and, in
these cases, consider the distress as ‘‘inherent’’ to the con-
dition, because treatment exclusion of the well functioning
group would be highly undesirable. Dysphoria does have the
original meaning of ‘‘painfulness’’ or ‘‘distress.’’ If the new
diagnosis would focus more on the dysphoria aspect (e.g., in
the name) than does the current one, no separate distress
criterion would be necessary, because the distress would be
defined as inherent to the diagnosis. The actual amount of
experienced and reported distress may vary between indi-
viduals. It is currently unknown how often gender dysphoric
applicants for treatment are indeed free of distress. It is con-
ceivable that, in some, reported levels at the time of applica-
tion are not high enough to qualify for a mental disorder,
and there are arguments to delete the distress requirement
altogether (see also Meyer-Bahlburg, 2009). However, a dia-
gnosis without a distress criterion or without the assump-
tion that distress is ‘‘inherent’’ to the diagnosis, may not be
considered suitable for the reimbursement of treatment. Also,
many ‘‘distress-less’’ gender variant individuals do not attend
clinics. In epidemiological studies, it would be difficult to
make a distinction between those who would and would not
fulfill the diagnostic criteria, and there would be a risk of
pathologizing those who are satisfied with their lives and stay
away from clinical interventions. By defining gender dys-
phoria as distressful in itself, clinicians would no longer have
to make a separate estimation of the amount of distress in
deciding whether or not someone has the diagnosis and is
eligible for treatment. Presently, it is unclear whether DSM-V
will retain separate a distress/impairment criterion.
The Fact that the Diagnosis Still Applies to Postoperative
Transsexuals
In a postoperative and hormonally treated individual, the
treatment has changed some sex characteristics and has fa-
cilitated living in the desired gender role. However, the treat-
ment has not changed the (natal) sex of that person. Because
the Acriterion refers tononconformity toone’s natal sex, it still
applies to post-treatment individuals. After treatment, the
person will still ‘‘pass’’ frequently as ‘‘the other sex,’’ desire to
liveorbe treated as ‘‘theother sex,’’ or feel thatheorshe has the
typical feelings and reactions of ‘‘the other sex.’’ The desire for
hormone treatment, or the belief that he or she was born the
wrong sex, which are both indicators of the B criterion, are not
likely to change after treatment either. Without a change in
504 Arch Sex Behav (2010) 39:499–513
123
formulation of the criteria or a specific statement in the text
addressing this issue, even post-surgical individuals will
continue to fulfill the criteria for GID and thus can be diag-
nosed with a mental disorder for the rest of their lives. As
having a mental disorder diagnosis may have adverse impli-
cations for employment, insurance, etc., the diagnosis should
exclude treated individuals who are no longer gender dys-
phoric. This could be done either by changing the formulation
of the criteria or explicitly excluding this group from the di-
agnosis in the text. Those who seek psychological treatment
postoperatively do not need a gender dysphoria-related diag-
nosis. Instead, other diagnoses, such as adjustment disorder or
depression, may be more appropriate. For postoperative hor-
mone treatment, other medical diagnoses, such as hypogonad-
ism, may be used in a similar way.
Core Criteria
If one were to adjust the current criteria set, what criteria
would be good candidates? In the DSM-III, the core criteria
of transsexualism were (A) a discomfort and inappropriate-
ness about one’s anatomic sex and (B) the wish to be rid of
one’s own genitals and live as a member of the other sex
(Appendix 1). In the DSM-III-R, they were (A) a sense of
inappropriateness about one’s assigned sex and (B) a per-
sistent preoccupation with getting rid of one’s primary and
secondary sex characteristics and acquiring the sex charac-
teristics of the other sex. In the DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR
versions, they were (A) a cross-gender identification and (B)
a discomfort with his or her sex. In the past and current DSM
versions, three aspects were considered relevant: (1) gender
identification, (2) gender role, and (3) physical aspects. Inter-
estingly, in earlier DSM versions, a cross-gender identifica-
tion was not a separate criterion, but apparently inferred from
the desire to live as a member of the other sex (combined with
the discomfort about one’s own sex). Thus, the core criteria
for transsexualism (DSM-III and DSM-III-R) or GID (DSM-
IV and DSM-IV-TR) have always consisted of combinations
of the following elements (see also Table 1):
1. Cross-gender identification (1)
2. Desire to live as a member of the other sex (2)
3. Sense of inappropriateness in the gender role belonging
to one’s natal sex (2)
4. Discomfort about one’s assigned sex (2)
5. Desire to have sex characteristics of the other sex (3)
6. Discomfort about one’s anatomic sex (3)
7. Wish to get rid of one’s natal sex characteristics (3)
The GIDNOS diagnosis in the DSM-III-R and DSM-IV-
TR, and the diagnosis GIDAANT in the DSM-III-R, were
meant to be used for all other types of clinically relevant
gender variance.
Considering the fact that the above criteria seem to have
been clinically useful (primarily when making sex reas-
signment decisions) in the past, and that no other criteria have
been proposed thus far, there seems to be no need for entirely
new criteria to indicate gender dysphoric conditions. Criteria
which do not have a dysphoric component (e.g., ‘‘desire to
live as a member of the other gender’’) should be modified to
prevent unnecessary pathologizing of non-clinical gender
variance (Winters, 2009).
Dimensionality of the Diagnosis
An important disadvantage of categorical diagnoses is loss
of information (Helzer, Kraemer, & Krueger, 2006). This is
one of the reasons that there is a growing interest in add-
ing dimensional components to DSM diagnoses, whenever
appropriate. For example, anxiety could be measured by using
an anxiety scale, but only those scoring above a certain cut-off
level would qualify for the diagnosis. As stated earlier, gender
variance or transgender phenomena are very heterogeneous.
Trying to force the whole variety of conditions into one dis-
crete category has already created disadvantageous clinical
decisions. In the DSM-IV-TR, one may fulfill the GID diag-
nosis if one’s GID is manifested by ‘‘partial’’ treatment goals
(e.g., some form of surgery only). However, such partial
treatment is often refused, because GID is still considered to be
identical to the former transsexualism diagnosis and, for this
condition, (complete) sex reassignment is seenas the treatment
of choice.
Although not all gender variance requires clinical atten-
tion, many conditions, ranging from mild to extreme, do. The
clearest example of extreme gender dysphoria consists of the
category that is still often labeled as transsexualism. For these
gender dysphoric conditions, a dimensional diagnosis could
be made in various ways. One possibility would be to just add
up some or all of the already existing indicators. Some would
need to be adjusted, because of the earlier mentioned criti-
cisms. For instance, natal sex and the present somatic/genital
situation are not distinguished in the current criteria, which
led to the problem that even postoperative well-adjusted
individuals can still be diagnosed with the current GID diag-
nosis.
If the adjusted criteria would be used again, the new
diagnosis should consist of the following indicators1:
1. Strong sense of discomfort with the gender role associ-
ated with one’s assigned gender
1 These criteria do not include the subsequent workgroup discussions.
They likely do not reflect the final criteria.
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2. Strong discomfort with one’s primary and/or secondary
sex characteristics, because they do not match one’s gen-
der identity2
3. Strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary
sex characteristics, because they do not match one’s gen-
der identity
4. Strong desire for primary and/or sex characteristics that
match one’s gender identity
5. Distress caused by a strong desire to live in the gender
role of the other gender and/or to be perceived by others
as a member of the other gender (or some alternative gen-
der different from one’s assigned gender)
6. Distress caused by a strong identification with the other
gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s
assigned gender)
The difference between a diagnosis, such as this one, and
the earlier DSM diagnoses is that, in previous versions, one
needed to fulfill all primary criteria to have the diagnosis. In
this conceptualization, in principle one could have a diag-
nosis if only one of the criteria is fulfilled. The required
number of indicators to differentiate gender dysphoric from
non-gender dysphoric individuals needs, of course, to be
investigated in further studies.
Because it is possible that one only needs to fulfill one
criterion in order to be gender dysphoric, the prevalence of
this condition, which would be heterogeneous in type and
intensity, would probably be much higher than the current
estimates of transsexualism or GID (Zucker & Lawrence,
2009). As in the case of homosexuality, a high prevalence of
gender dysphoria in the general population would raise more
questions on whether the condition should be considered a
mental disorder (Drescher, 2009).
To further dimensionalize the diagnosis, one may even
consider assigning weights to each of the elements. For some
criteria, ‘‘completeness’’ or ‘‘extremeness’’ would be appro-
priate; for others, ‘‘intensity,’’ ‘‘duration,’’ or ‘‘persistence.’’
However, it would be very difficult to obtain clinician agree-
ment on such aspects, and probably unnecessarily complicate
diagnosis making. The accompanying text should state ex-
plicitly that the diagnosis no longer applies to persons who had
their hormonal and/or surgical treatment. For postoperative
individuals with regret, adjusted formulations are necessary. If
the criteria would be used for individuals with DSD (but see
Meyer-Bahlburg, 2009), the formulation of the criteria would
also have to be adapted for this group.
In a consensus meeting on the DSM-V of the WPATH,
held in Oslo, June 2009, it was stated that separate criteria for
adolescents should be considered. As in many other diag-
noses, the clinical management may differ considerably be-
tween the two age groups. However, specific adolescent is-
sues (e.g., pubertal delay as a diagnostic aid) are more appro-
priately addressed in the supporting text than in a separate set
of diagnostic criteria.
The Concept of Gender Dysphoria
If a gender variance-related diagnosis would stay in the DSM,
a more appropriate term or name should be selected. This term
needs to fulfill a number of requirements. The term should (1)
clearly express the heart of the problem, the discontent with
one’s physical sex characteristics and/or assigned gender, and
not be applicable to gender variant individuals without this
discontent; (2) be dimensional; it should be possible to have
more or less complete forms of the condition; (3) allow fluc-
tuations, i.e., increase as well as decrease over time, and, fi-
nally, (4) it should be acceptable and non-stigmatizing to those
who fulfill criteria 1–6 of the revised diagnostic criteria.
Considering these requirements, ‘‘gender dysphoria’’ seems
an appropriate term. This was also concluded in the earlier
mentioned WPATH consensus meeting on the DSM-V. It is
clear what someone with gender dysphoria suffers from, one
can be more or less gender dysphoric, one can suffer from it,
Table 1 Core criteria of transsexualism or GID in DSM-III to DSM-IV-TR
DSM-III
(transsexualism)
DSM-III-R
(transsexualism)
DSM-IV-TR (GID)
Cross-gender identification A-criterion
Desire to live as a member of the opposite sex B-criterion (as symptom of A-criterion)
Sense of inappropriateness in gender role belonging to
one’s sex
B-criterion
Discomfort about one’s assigned sex A-criterion
Desire to have sex characteristics of the other sex B-criterion (as an example of a symptom
of B-criterion)
Discomfort about one’s anatomic sex A-criterion B-criterion
Wish to be rid of one’s own sex characteristics B-criterion B-criterion (as symptom of B-criterion)
2 For young adolescents, this criterion also refers to anticipated sex
characteristics (Winters, 2009).
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but, with or without treatment, some or all criteria may no
longer be applicable. It further seems that the term is relatively
well-accepted in the transgender community, although some
may prefer even more neutral terms, such as ‘‘gender discor-
dance,’’ ‘‘gender dissonance,’’ ‘‘gender discomfort’’ or ‘‘gen-
der incongruence.’’
Gender Dysphoria and Treatment Decisions
As with other diagnoses, treatment and diagnosis are not
related in a simple way. What is considered suitable will
depend on the specific combination of symptoms, as well as
other, non diagnosis-related aspects. For instance, someone
who is distressed because of a strong desire to live in the
gender role of the other gender might qualify for some form of
psychotherapy. However, someone fulfilling this criterion
and also having a strong desire to be rid of his or her primary
and/or secondary sex characteristics, who applies for breast
removal would probably not be helped by psychotherapy
only. Whether a cut-off point for the previous diagnosis of
transsexualism would be desirable and what this cut-off point
should be remains to be investigated.
Specifiers
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and DSM-
IV-TR require, for sexually mature individuals with a diagnosis
of GID, to specify to whom they feel sexually attracted. They
offer four alternatives, i.e., sexually attracted to males, to fe-
males, to both, and to neither. This subdivision is largely based
on the work ofBlanchardand colleagues (e.g., Blanchard,1989;
Blanchard, Clemmensen, & Steiner, 1987). These specifiers
were recently challenged by Veale, Clarke, and Lomax (2008),
but their critique was rebuked by Lawrence and Bailey (2008)
and by Lawrence (in press).
Looking at the history of transsexualism, the development
of gender identity clinics with the availability of sex reas-
signment surgery, and the diversity of social and cultural
contexts in which such services were and are offered, it is
obvious that social and cultural biases have greatly influ-
enced diagnostic criteria and the access to hormonal and
surgical treatment.
When in the mid-1960s, the first gender identity clinic was
established at the Johns Hopkins University Clinic in Balti-
more, transsexuals were described as being rather asexual
(e.g.,Money&Ehrhardt,1970;Pauly, 1965). Inanearlypaper,
transsexualism was characterized as ‘‘an escape from…sexual
impulses’’ (Worden & Marsh, 1955, in Meyerowitz, 2002).
Benjamin (1966) asserted that ‘‘Many transsexuals have no
overt sex life at all, their sex drive being low to begin with and,
in the case of MTFs, diminished sometimes to zero by estro-
gen’’ (p. 49). This picture was certainly related to the ramifi-
cations of the McCarthy era and its anti-sexual bias. Data from
Sweden from the 1970s about regrets after sex reassignment
surgery also characterized transsexuals as having a weak
sexual libido (Wa˚linder, Lundstro¨m, & Thuwe, 1978). This
thinkingabout the sexualityof transsexuals has also influenced
treatment decisions. For instance, the first treatment programs
for transsexuals in Australia strictly excluded MTF transsex-
uals if they had a history of active engagement in ‘‘homosex-
ual’’ encounters (Ball, 1981; Ross & Need, 1989). Lundstro¨m
(1981) reported long marriages and high sexual partner mobi-
lity to be predictors of poor outcome. Wa˚linder et al. (1978)
warned to be cautious when applicants for sex reassignment
surgery show a strong sexual interest or have heterosexual
experience, because this may indicate ‘‘a lower intensity of
transsexual symptomatology and consequently ambivalence
towards sex reassignment’’ (p. 19). On the other hand, Ben-
jamin (1966) identified various forms of sexual activity before
sex reassignment surgery as positive predictors for outcome,
and the results he reported confirmed this. It is likely that,
depending on the criteria of access to treatment in a specific
treatment facility, applicants adjust their biographical data
with regard to sexuality. This makes the quality of the infor-
mation, especially when given during clinical assessment,
questionable.
Another problem concerning the usefulness of sexuality-
related GID specifiers regards the stability of sexual orienta-
tion. In the discussion on homosexuality (of individuals
without GID), the stability or instability of sexual orientation
has been a matter of debate. Recently, prospective studies in
non-transsexual samples of women suggest that there is con-
siderable fluidity in sexual orientation, especially for women
(Diamond, 2000; Diamond & Butterworth, 2008). In the
1990s, the question arose if the preferences for the gender of
sex partners would also change in the course of hormonal and
surgical treatment (e.g., Daskalos, 1998; Lawrence, 1999, 2005).
As Lawrence (1999) points out, it is extremely difficult to assess
such changes in individuals with a GID diagnosis, as they pre-
operatively might give information only to be admitted to hor-
monal and surgical treatment. However, there is no doubt that
changes as to the preferred gender of sex partner do occur (De
Cuypere et al., 2005; Lawrence, 2005; Schroder & Carroll, 1999;
some 30 in a sample of more than 1,200 GID patients seen by
F.P.).
Over theyears,various sexuality related subcategories have
been proposed (e.g., Blanchard, 1989; Blanchard et al., 1987;
Buhrich & McConaghy, 1978; Freund, Steiner, & Chan, 1982;
Money & Gaskin, 1970–1971; Sørenson, 1981; for a review,
see Lawrence, in press). In clinical writings, there seems to be
agreement that transsexual subtypes do exist, although there is
no agreement on the number and kind of relevant subtypes.
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Although sexual orientation subtyping may be of interest to
researchers in the field, no clinical decisions are currently based
on this classification. Also, in the transgender community,
there is strong resistance against subtyping on the basis of
sexual orientation and activity and even against having to
give this information for scientific purposes only. This was
also concluded by clinicians attending the WPATH consen-
sus meeting (Oslo, June 2009). The term autogynephilia,
which is used for one subtype, is considered highly offensive
by some (e.g., Winters, 2005, 2008). The finding that ‘‘homo-
sexual’’ and ‘‘nonhomosexual’’ subgroups differed in psy-
chological functioning (Smith et al., 2005) could not be repli-
cated in a yet unpublished recent study at the same gender
identity clinic. The first study was conducted in the early
1990s, when relatively few people had Internet access and
applicants were not well informed about the fact that this
topic was hotly debated (Smith et al., 2005). It is therefore
likely that, more than 10 years later, the increased awareness
regarding the sexual orientation issue has led to less reliable
reports of sex reassignment applicants on their sexual ori-
entation. Considering the disadvantages and few, primarily
research related, advantages of this subdivision, one should
reconsider sexual orientation as a specifier.
In theDSM-IV-TR, it isnoted that thedevelopmental routes
aredifferent for transsexual individuals witha veryearly cross-
gender identification (childhood) versus those who report
cross-gender identification starting after puberty. In a sub-
sequent study, such developmental routes were confirmed by
Smith et al. (2005). In children around the age of 3 years, one
may observe cross-gender behaviors without this being a clear
cut predictor for later gender dysphoria or the wish for sex
reassignment in adulthood. The children act differently than
their same-sex peers, but are not yet able to mentalize and to
verbalize their feeling of ‘‘otherness.’’ It seems that only when
this feeling of being different is verbalized by the child and
incorporated in the child’s sense of self that this increases the
likelihood of later transgenderism. But even then, factors
influencing the ongoing development in prepuberty and pub-
erty may still play a decisive role as to the persistence of such
feelings of ‘‘otherness.’’ While the first large prospective study
of young children (feminine boys who fulfilled some or all of
the GID criteria) showed that innearlyall the genderdysphoria
disappeared (Green, 1974, 1985, 1987), more recent data
demonstrate that about 10–25% will continue to be gender
dysphoric (Drummond, Bradley, Peterson-Badali, & Zucker,
2008; Wallien & Cohen-Kettenis, 2008; Zucker & Bradley,
1995). With regard to sexuality, it was found that transsexuals
attracted to partners of their natal sex more often belonged to
the early onset group than the ones attracted to partners of the
other sex. It is likely that there is an overlap between the
groups, but this would have to be confirmed by more, prefer-
ably prospective, research, as retrospective data of adults
regarding the dateofonsetof their feelingofbeing different are
not reliable. Such research should perhaps even differentiate
between onset in various phases (e.g., very early childhood
[before the age of about 3 years], childhood until puberty,
adolescence, and adulthood) as it is conceivable that more than
the two currently described routes exist. It should also be
precise as to what exactly is considered to be ‘‘early onset’’: the
presence of certain cross gender behaviors and/or preferences,
anatomic dysphoria or a full GID diagnosis. Future research
will have to show also whether making a distinction between
the subgroups is clinically useful.
Although there are no convincing data on the clinical
utility of both subtypes, for research purposes it does seem to
be important to make a distinction between subtypes. For
instance, in etiological research, which is still in a not very
advanced stage, one may need to take the distinction into
account. It would also be worthwhile to investigate the
relationship between onset age and sexual orientation more
extensively. If they are highly correlated and onset age has
proven its clinical utility, onset age rather than sexual ori-
entation could be used.
Lawrence (in press) compared sexual orientation versus
age of onset as specifiers for the diagnosis of GID, using
seven criteria: (1) Is the specifier unambiguous? (2) Can it be
easily ascertained? (3) Can it be ascertained reliably? (4)
Does it facilitate concise, comprehensive clinical descrip-
tion? (5) Does it provide prognostic value for treatment-
related outcomes? (6) Does it provide predictive value for
comorbid psychopathology? (7) Does it facilitate research
and offer heuristic value? While Lawrence concludes that
only the second of these questions is confirmed for the age of
onset specifier, Lawrence found confirmation of all seven
questions for the sexual orientation specifier. It is no surprise
that Lawrence concluded that the sexual orientation specifier
is superior to the age of onset specifier, and should remain in
the DSM. However, Lawrence also indicates that onset age
has hardly been studied, because, historically, there was more
scientific interest in sexual orientation than in onset age.
Considering the need for a better understanding of the phe-
nomenon of gender dysphoria, one might therefore draw just
the opposite conclusion: that it is the importance of onset age
for the long-term development of gender dysphoric individ-
uals we need to know much more about. Lawrence also does
not address the possibility that sexual orientation has become
so controversial that, in a clinical setting, the information
given by applicants for medical interventions may have be-
come invalid. For these reasons, it is likely that a specifier
focusing on onset age, provided that it is clearly defined and
well measured, will contribute even more to our under-
standing of gender dysphoria than sexual orientation.
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Recommendations
Considering the criticisms regarding the A and B criteria, there
are two possibilities.
1. One possibility is to leave the criteria as they are, but to
make them more stringent. This means returning to the
dichotomy of the DSM-III and III-R, where only the former
‘‘transsexuals’’ had the diagnosis, and different or less
extreme types of gender dysphoria were all included in
NOS-like diagnoses or had no diagnosis at all. Although
most of the criteria and indicators would remain the same,
the ambiguity would have to be taken out of the formu-
lations. Also, other adjustments (e.g., name change, exclu-
sion of the postoperative group, more focus on the dys-
phoria) would be needed. For less experienced clinicians
who have yet to make sex reassignment eligibility deci-
sions, it would be easier to work with this type of binary
classification than with the DSM-IV-TR type, where a GID
diagnosis includes extreme as well as less extreme forms of
genderdysphoria,andaGIDNOSdiagnosiscomprisingyet
other forms of gender dysphoria. However, such a dicho-
tomy would disregard the wide variety of gender identity
related phenomena clinicians encounter. It would also still
be of little help for treatment decisions and research regard-
ing the heterogeneous conditions included in the other,
NOS diagnosis. Finally, it would maintain the use of the
diagnosis in the obsolete search for the ‘‘true transsexual’’
or ‘‘ideal surgical candidate.’’
2. Another possibility would be to accommodate the in-
creasing awareness of, and empirical support for, the
variety of gender dysphoric conditions. This could be
done by means of a more dimensional approach using,
somewhat adjusted indicators that have been part of the
earlier DSM diagnoses. This approach allows for differ-
ent degrees of gender dysphoria, and makes more explicit
that a diagnosis not necessarily implicates eligibility for
sex reassignment. By giving the diagnosis the name of
gender dysphoria, distress would be an aspect of the di-
agnosis, making an extra distress/impairment criterion
redundant.
Because of the strong resistance against sexuality related
specifiers, which may result in a still increasing unreliability of
collected data, and the relative difficulty assessing sexual ori-
entation in individuals pursuing hormonal and surgical inter-
ventions to change their sex characteristics, closer investigation
of onset age as a potential specifier is warranted.
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Appendix 1: Diagnostic Criteria of Gender Identity
Disorders in the DSM (Adolescent and Adult Criteria)
DSM-III
Transsexualism (302.5x)
A. Sense of discomfort and inappropriateness about one’s
anatomic sex.
B. Wish to be rid of one’s own genitals and to live as a
member of the other sex.
C. The disturbance has been continuous (not limited to
periods of stress) for at least 2 years.
D. Absence of physical intersex or genetic abnormality.
E. Not due to another mental disorder, such as Schizophrenia.
Subclassification by predominant prior sexual history:
1 = asexual
2 = homosexual (same anatomic sex)
3 = heterosexual (other anatomic sex)
4 = unspecified
Atypical Gender Identity Disorder (302.85)
This is a residual category for coding disorders in gender
identity that are not classifiable as a specific Gender Identity
Disorder.
DSM-III-R
Transsexualism (302.50)
A. Persistent discomfort and sense of inappropriateness
about one’s assigned sex.
B. Persistent preoccupation for at least 2 years with getting
rid of one’s primary and secondary sex characteristics
and acquiring the sex characteristics of the other sex.
C. The person has reached puberty.
Specify history of sexual orientation: asexual, homosex-
ual, heterosexual, or unspecified.
Gender Identity Disorder of Adolescence or Adulthood,
Nontranssexual Type (GIDAANT) (302.85)
A. Persistent or recurrent discomfort and sense of inappro-
priateness about one’s assigned sex.
B. Persistent or recurrent cross-dressing in the role of the other
sex, either in fantasy or actuality, but not for the purpose of
sexual excitement (as in Transvestic Fetishism).
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C. No persistent preoccupation (for at least 2 years) with
getting rid of one’s primary and secondary sex charac-
teristics and acquiring the sex characteristics of the other
sex (as in Transsexualism).
D. The person has reached puberty.
Specify history of sexual orientation: asexual, homosex-
ual, heterosexual, or unspecified.
302.85 Gender Identity Disorder Not Otherwise
Specified
Disorders in gender identity that are not classifiable as a
specific Gender Identity Disorder.
Examples:
1. Children with persistent cross-dressing without the other
criteria for Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood
2. Adults with transient, stress-related cross-dressing behav-
ior
3. Adults with the clinical features of Transsexualism of
less than 2 years’ duration
4. People who have a persistent preoccupation with cas-
tration or penectomy without a desire to acquire the sex
characteristics of the other sex
DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR
Gender Identity Disorder
A. A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not
merely a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of
being the other sex)
In adolescents and adults, the disturbance is manifested
by symptoms such as a stated desire to be the other sex,
frequent passing as the other sex, desire to live or be
treated as the other sex, or the conviction that he or she
has the typical feelings and reactions of the other sex.
B. Persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex.
In adolescents and adults, the disturbance is manifested
by symptoms such as preoccupation with getting rid of
primary and secondary sex characteristics (e.g., request
for hormones, surgery, or other procedures to physically
alter sexual characteristics to simulate the other sex) or
belief that he or she was born the wrong sex.
C. The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical inter-
sex condition.
D. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning.
Code based on current age:
302.85 Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents or Adults
Specify if (for sexually mature individuals):
Sexually Attracted to Males
Sexually Attracted to Females
Sexually Attracted to Both
Sexually Attracted to Neither
Gender Identity Disorder Not Otherwise Specified
(302.6)
This category is included for coding disorders in gender
identity that are not classifiable as a specific Gender Identity
Disorder. Examples include
1. Intersex conditions (e.g., partial androgen insensitivity
syndrome or congenital adrenal hyperplasia) and accom-
panying gender dysphoria
2. Transient, stress-related cross-dressing behavior
3. Persistent preoccupation with castration or penectomy
without a desire to acquire the sex characteristics of the
other sex
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